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Abstract: In this Feature, we will analyze the EU Google Shopping case to 
try to identify how the two-sided nature of Google’s business has affected the 
European Commission’s analysis. To do this, we will keep in mind lessons 
from the American Express case in the US and the controversy raised by the 
decisions of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the US 
Supreme Court, adopting a single-market and net-effect approach to that case. 
We hope the lessons we draw from both cases will help us reflect on the future 
of antitrust law enforcement in view of modern two-sided platforms.  
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Introduction 
In June 2017, the world was astonished at the €2.42 billion fine that 
the European Commission (also referred to in this Feature as “Commission” 
or “EU”) imposed on Google as a penalty for the company allegedly abusing 
its dominance in the search engine market, by building its Google Shopping 
service. After concluding an investigation that started in 2010, the EU 
determined that Google had abused a dominant position in the European 
Economic Area (EEA) by favoring its own comparison shopping service 
(Google Shopping) on its search results pages to the detriment of rival 
comparison shopping services.1 
 
                                                     
1 Commission Press Release, IP/17/1784 (Jun. 27, 2017) and Commission 
Decision, case AT.39740 (Google Search (Shopping)) (Feb. 25, 1991).  
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According to the Commission, Google adopted the strategy of 
systematically positioning and prominently displaying Google Shopping on 
the Google general search results pages, and of not applying the same system 
of penalties to Google Shopping, which it used to apply to other services. 
Crucial to the case is the fact that competitor comparison services were not 
allowed to bid for space on Google Shopping, so they were subjected to 
Google’s search algorithms that pushed them down the list of search results. 
That allegedly caused an artificial diversion of traffic from the rival 
comparison shopping services, impairing their ability to compete, and 
ultimately hurting consumers and innovation. 2 
Google tried to defend itself by arguing that the company never 
intended to artificially divert traffic and harm consumers; rather, its intention 
was to improve the quality of its shopping service and, consequently, improve 
the user experience.3  The company is now appealing against this record fine. 
It has also been defending itself in other countries, regarding the same or 
similar issues, as is the case in Brazil and India. 
Grasping the analysis of the Google Shopping case before the 
European Commission is challenging in a sense. The relevant product market 
for Google Shopping was defined as the market for comparison shopping 
services. Based on the literature, it can be reasonably considered a two-sided 
market corresponding to a two-sided platform. 4 
Note that, although the European Commission did not expressly 
refer to a two-sided platform when addressing the market for comparison 
                                                     
2 Commission Press Release, IP/17/1784, supra note 1. See, also, 
https://theconversation.com/googles-defence-for-breaking-eu-law-our-users-
wanted-us-to-do-it-80218.  
3 As stated by Google’s General Counsel on June 27, 2017 (see 
https://www.blog.google/topics/google-europe/european-commission-decision-
shopping-google-story/). See also Google’s appeal to the European General Court 
(European Commission, ‘Action brought on 11 September 2017 – Google and 
Alphabet v Commission’, Case T-612/17, Official Journal of the European Union 
(Oct. 30, 2017).  
4 For instance, Sébastien Broos and Jorge Marcos Ramos (2015): “Google Search 
is a two-sided platform… Google Shopping is also a two-sided platform operating 
a vertical search engine…” Google, Google Shopping and Amazon: The 
Importance of Competing Business Models and Two-Sided Intermediaries in 
Defining Relevant Markets. Giacomo Luchetta (2012) and Manne and Wright 
(2010), for instance, have different views. 
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shopping services, but only when referring to general search, we understand 
that Google Shopping is a two-sided platform and also that the European 
Commission was completely aware of this while analyzing the case.5 For us, 
the very fact that the Commission adopted a single-market approach to the 
relevant product market for comparison shopping services is evidence of this.  
As we focus on comparison shopping services as the central market 
(encompassing advertisers, on one side, and users, on the other) at stake in the 
Google Shopping case, we wonder why, in another two-sided market case 
under the spotlight – US v. American Express6 – there was so much 
controversy over whether there should be a single or a multiple-market 
approach to the two-sided platform (the credit card transaction platform). That 
is, why, in that case, the District Court considered that the cardholders should 
occupy a different market than the merchants on the other side of the platform, 
instead of making up a single product market for credit card services. The US 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (“Circuit Court”) later reverted the 
approach and the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision in Ohio 
v. American Express.7 
Moreover, we also wonder how much the EU’s refusal of Google’s 
central argument, in that the company’s intention with Google Shopping was 
to improve the user’s shopping experience,8 resembles the American Express 
(or, simply, “Amex”) controversy over whether the focus of the effects 
analysis should be in the “overall consumer satisfaction” (a “net-effect” 
analysis) or not. Our impression is that the resemblance is great, even though 
both situations may be significantly different in nature. We see in both cases 
the concern whether improvements for consumers, efficiencies, or even 
procompetitive effects can justify anticompetitive effects. 
At the end of this Feature, we will conclude that both the Google 
Shopping and the American Express cases are very different from each other, 
requiring different rationales, even though both deal with two-sided platforms. 
But we also aim to show that they can be very similar in what matters most: 
                                                     
5 For instance, see language of paragraphs 159, 196 and 206 of the Commission 
Decision. 
6 United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016). 
7 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 355 (2017) and Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 
138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018). 
8 See the public note issued by Google’s General Counsel, supra note 3. 
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the importance given to antitrust principles when addressing potential 
anticompetitive effects and weighing them against gains and efficiencies. 
1. The idea of two-sided markets and how it plays out in Google 
Shopping and Amex 
As explained by Katz and Sallet (2018),9 the scholarly definition of 
two-sided (or multisided) platforms (or markets) comes from Jean-Charles 
Rochet and Jean Tirole in their 2006 work Two-Sided Markets: A Progress 
Report.10 In a nutshell, a firm is a platform if total transaction volume is 
affected when the structure of prices (p1 + p2 = P as the net price level) is 
modified while holding the net price constant. If the structure (individual 
prices p1 and p1) does not matter, but only the net price, thus, under the 
definition, the firm is not a two-sided platform. 
In practice, in two-sided markets, there are two groups of consumers 
and a platform is needed in order to connect them. This is because there are 
benefits arising from the simultaneous presence of the two groups and only 
the platform is able to internalize them, making both groups interdependent 
and, at the same time, dependent upon the platform.11 Some of the most 
important online markets can be understood as two-sided platforms, such as 
Google, Facebook, Amazon and EBay. Other markets, such as credit cards, 
video-games, shopping centers and real estate brokers, are also two-sided 
platforms.12  
Although Katz and Sallet make it clear that distinguishing between 
two-sided markets and single-sided ones is not always easy – which suggests 
that the nature of antitrust enforcement should not differ so much based on 
which type of market is being addressed13 – indeed, when it comes to two-
                                                     
9 See Katz, Michael L. and Sallet, Jonathan, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust 
Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2148, 2149 (2018). 
10 Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean. Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 
37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006). 
11 See Mattiuzzo, Marcela. Propaganda online e privacidade: o varejo de dados 
pessoais na perspectiva antitruste. Revista do IBRAC, v. 21, n. 26, at 5 and 6, 
jul./dez. 2014.  
12 Idem, at 5. 
13 See Katz and Sallet (2018), supra note 9, at 2148. 
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sided platforms, economic analysis has to take into account the relationships 
between the sides of a platform before drawing antitrust conclusions.14 
“Two-sided” and “multisided” are usually used as synonyms. In this 
Feature, we will prefer “two-sided” over “multisided”. Also, most 
of the time, we will use “market” and “platform” interchangeably, 
but for the cases where “market” stands for the technical term 
“relevant market”, when we will prefer it over “platform”. 
The credit card industry is a good example of the idea of two-sided 
markets. As explained by the Circuit Court in the Amex case, the cardholder 
and the merchant depend on the widespread acceptance of a credit card. 
Cardholders will not see the benefit in holding a card unless it is accepted by 
a wide range of merchants; likewise, merchants will not be interested in 
accepting a card that not many cardholders use.15 To succeed, the credit card 
network has to strike the right price balance on the two sides of the market, 
although it may be difficult given the tension between the interests of the 
merchants and the cardholders – merchants want lower network fees, while 
cardholders want rewards, services and benefits that are funded by fees. A 
credit card company may even decide not to charge cardholders for usage 
(charging only merchants), given the tension.16 
The tension between merchants and cardholders is at the heart of the 
Amex case. The complaint filed by the United States and seventeen Plaintiff 
States was exactly that merchants were prohibited, by the anti-steering 
provisions of the Amex merchant agreement, to encourage customers to use 
other less expensive or otherwise preferred competitors’ cards. Plaintiffs 
sustained that those provisions had the potential to eliminate Interbrand 
competition and reduce the incentives for networks to reduce credit card 
fees.17 Amex’s interest in maintaining those fees relates exactly to the 
potential that merchants’ steering behavior has of interfering with the network 
ability to balance its two-sided net price.18 
                                                     
14 Motta, Massimo. Interview for the Competition Policy International (CPI 
Talks), May 15, 2018. 
15 US v. American Express, supra note 6, at 187. 
16 Idem, at 187. 
17 US v. American Express, supra note 6, at 192 and 193. 
18 Idem, at 193. 
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As for Google Shopping, as we mentioned, we believe it is a two-
sided platform. Feedback effects are a powerful indication of that. We 
disagree with Manne and Wright (2010) in that the feedback effects in Google 
are usually unidirectional, which would make them attenuated, as they are 
very much focused on the advertisers (who want more and more users) and 
not on the users (who are not interested in advertisers).19 But we believe that, 
in Google Shopping, this is simply not the case, as users looking for a product 
presumably want to have as many different advertisements as possible 
displayed on their screen for the purpose of price comparison. The more 
advertisers displaying the desired product on the shopping carousel, the better 
the users’ shopping experience.20 That is why we understand feedback effects 
in Google Shopping as being bidirectional. 
In any event, and also considering that there is no consensus as to 
the definition of two-sided markets, one could apply the suggested concept of 
Katz and Sallet (2018),21 based on E. Glenn Weyl (2010)22, to realize that, 
even if the bilateral feedback effects were absent, Google Shopping could still 
be considered a two-sided platform. According to this concept, a firm can be 
considered a two-sided platform when “cross-platform network effects occur 
in at least one direction and the firm facilitates interactions between two or 
more groups of users, can set distinct prices to different user groups, and has 
market power with respect to those groups”. Cross-platform network effects 
happen when members on one side of the platform make the platform more 
attractive to users on the opposite side. As they point out, besides being able 
to encompass firms commonly labeled as two-sided platforms in recent 
antitrust litigation (which includes, in our opinion, Google Shopping) this 
approach is also more helpful for the purposes of antitrust enforcement.23 
Departing from the issues clearly identified by Katz and Sallet 
(2018),24 we see two major implications when considering the comparison 
                                                     
19 Manne and Wright (2010), supra note 8, at 38. 
20 Obviously, provided that there is enough diversity on the carousel as to prices 
and types of products. This is not trivial considering that announcers bid for space 
on the carrousel, instead of being subjected to a general search algorithm. 
21 See supra note 9, at 2150. 
22 Weyl, E. Glen. A Price Theory of Multi- Sided Platforms, 100 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1642, 1644 (2010). 
23 See supra note 9, at 2150. 
24 See supra note 9, at 2142 to 2146. 
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shopping service as a two-sided platform. The first one is to have to decide 
whether to adopt (i) a single-market approach, encompassing both sides of the 
platform as two interdependent mechanisms of one single structure, or (ii) a 
multiple-market approach, considering each side of the platform as a specific 
market. The second one is to adopt either (i) a net-effect analysis, accounting 
for possible benefits or efficiencies giving rise to the so-called “overall 
consumer satisfaction”, or (ii) a separate-effect analysis, whereby benefits or 
procompetitive effects on one side of the platform cannot compensate for 
anticompetitive effects on the other side.  
Both implications are at the core of the controversy in the Amex 
case, as the Circuit Court (affirmed by the Supreme Court) did not agree with 
the District Court’s multiple-market approach (separating cardholders and 
merchants) and required that antitrust injury to cardholders (and not only to 
merchants) would also have to be proven. By adopting a net-effect approach 
and mentioning the need to advance the “overall consumer satisfaction”, the 
Circuit Court considered that the anti-steering provisions could be helpful to 
maintain cardholder satisfaction, which could, for its part, have positive 
effects on merchants’ sales.25 
Regarding Google Shopping, the European Commission conceived 
of a single market instead of two (one market corresponding to one side of the 
platform: users and advertisers) and analyzed the possible anticompetitive 
concerns with regards to the whole platform, and not to each side separately. 
On the other hand, as there were no anticompetitive effects on the other side 
of the platform (advertisers) at issue in the case, the EU did not have to address 
the net or separate-effect analysis issue within the platform. In any event, the 
Commission was not persuaded by the idea of considering benefits or 
efficiencies on one side of the platform (the comparison shopping users) as 
possibly outweighing (and, thus, justifying) anticompetitive effects on 
competitors.26  
                                                     
25 US v. American Express, supra note 6, at 207. 
26 We believe that there were no anticompetitive effects on the other side of the 
platform (advertisers) at issue in the case. In Google Shopping, alleged negative 
effects overflow the platform to reach competing comparison shopping platforms: 
competing comparison shopping platforms were claiming dominance abuse, not 
Google’s advertisers. We will discuss this in detail in chapter 3, below. 
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2. The approaches to market and effects  
The Amex case can help us reflect on the appropriateness of defining 
a single market when dealing with two-sided markets. We do not believe that 
there is a one-size-fits-all approach to relevant market in all cases, because 
there are markets whose relationships within the platform seem to request a 
single-market approach (this is the case of Google Shopping, in our view), 
while others should be addressed by means of a multiple-market approach (for 
instance, the credit card platforms, such as Amex). 
The Circuit Court disagreed with the District Court’s market 
approach, which considered that the cardholders should occupy a different 
market than the merchants on the other side of the platform, instead of making 
up a single product market for credit card services. For the Circuit Court, the 
District Court should have collapsed the markets for credit card issuance and 
credit card network services into one platform-wide market for the provision 
of credit card services.27 The US Supreme Court adopted the same approach28. 
By now adopting this single-market approach, it was much easier to also adopt 
a net-effect analysis whereby the presence of potential procompetitive effects 
benefitting cardholders (including more rewards) could be deemed a 
legitimate reason for tolerating actual negative effects on merchants deriving 
from Amex’s anti-steering provisions.  
In Google Shopping, the Commission clearly identified two markets 
under its analysis – the markets for general search services and comparison 
shopping services.29 In our opinion, however, the fact that one of the sides of 
the platform bore an intersection with the market for general search engines – 
that is, the Google Shopping platform is not exclusive inasmuch as it uses the 
general Google search page – does not mean that they belong to the same 
platform. The presence of the market for general search in the EU analysis 
was crucial, though, for the argument on abuse of dominance, according to 
which Google had tried to leverage its position in the comparison shopping 
market by using its established power in the general search market. 
As for conduct effects, differences between both cases at issue are 
great. The US Supreme Court and the Circuit Court saw potential benefits 
                                                     
27 US v. American Express, supra note 6, at 197. 
28 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., supra note 7, at 2287. 
29 Commission Decision, case AT.39740 (Google Search (Shopping)), supra note 
1, paragraphs 155 and 191. 
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associated with the anti-steering provisions, so much that it would not be the 
case to disturb the way the market operates and, in its view, it was an error to 
focus so much on the interests of merchants while not paying attention to those 
of cardholders.30 On the other hand, the EU totally dismissed Google’s central 
justification that its conduct had a good effect on the users’ experience and, 
not being abusive, should not be condemned.31 For the EU, engaging in certain 
conduct just because consumers will react positively to it is no reasonable 
justification. 
3. Why Google Shopping and Amex are so different  
In Google Shopping, the EU accounted for a single market 
definition: the market for comparison shopping services, instead of defining 
two markets within the comparison shopping platform (with advertisers 
making up one of them, and users, another). 
However, in Google Shopping, the EU ended up considering that the 
benefits to users, by virtue of the improvement in the users’ experience, could 
not justify potential harm to competitors in the comparison shopping market. 
Those competitors, not being allowed to participate as advertisers on the other 
side of the Google Shopping platform, ended up being excluded from the 
market by Google allegedly diverting the traffic to its own service, as 
sustained by the EU.  
This draws our attention in light of the approach of the Circuit Court 
and the US Supreme Court to the Amex case. There, the courts realized that 
procompetitive effects brought about by non-steered32 cardholders, including 
their possibility of gaining more rewards, and that potentially stimulating their 
increased use of the Amex card and ultimately benefiting merchants with more 
purchases33 could outweigh anticompetitive effects on merchants. That is, the 
merchants not being able to request that cardholders make purchases with 
                                                     
30 US v. American Express, supra note 6, at 204. 
31 See the Commission Decision, case AT.39740 (Google Search (Shopping)), 
supra note 1, paragraph 159.  
32 “Non-steered” as not being induced by merchants to use another card brand 
instead of Amex, as explained in chapter 1, above. 
33 See US v. American Express, supra note 6, at 206, for instance: “…merchants 
still would benefit from Amex’s NDPs [nondiscriminatory provisions – the anti-
steering provisions] insofar as those NDPs help attract cardholders.”  
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cards that charge merchants less than Amex could be fine, in the eyes of the 
court, as long as there would be no injury to cardholders and that they actually 
ended up better off within the platform.34 
One might think that this approach is due to the fact that both sides 
of the comparison shopping platform are not interdependent to the same 
degree as in other two-sided markets, notably, the credit card platforms. In 
Google Shopping, advertisers are heavily dependent on the flux of users to 
verify whether advertising is worth it, but users may be comparatively less 
dependent on the number of advertisements displayed.35 In Amex, the 
cardholders are so highly dependent upon the number of merchants that accept 
the credit card, and merchants are so highly dependent on the number of 
cardholders using the card, that an imbalance on either side can easily ruin the 
functioning of the entire platform.  
Considering our arguments on the existence of feedback effects 
from the advertisers to benefit the users of a comparison shopping platform,36 
we are not really persuaded by this argument. We understand that the bond 
between the two sides of a credit card platform may be stronger than the ties 
within a comparison shopping platform. It actually seems that the 
interdependence in the latter case is more “organic” than in the former case 
because, hypothetically, it might be possible for a comparison shopping 
platform to operate with not so many advertisements, but users would hardly 
use a credit card that is not accepted by that many merchants. Even so, there 
is also a clear – and still strong – interdependence between users and 
advertisers in the comparison shopping platform, and this fact makes us 
wonder why the effects treatment on this platform would differ so much from 
the treatment given to credit card platforms. 
In our view, the crucial difference between both cases does not rely 
on the degree of interdependence within the platforms. For us, the crucial 
difference is the concern about direct effects on competition in Google 
Shopping, while, in Amex, the effects were on merchants (that is, within the 
                                                     
34 US v. American Express, supra note 6, at 205. 
35 Of course, users need a great number of comparison shopping results in order 
to find the platform useful, but there are reasonably so many results that users will 
look for and check out, not to mention the importance of the results quality in 
terms of diversity. As for advertisers, unless there is widespread use of the 
comparison search platform, it just may not be worth advertising.  
36 See supra chapter 1. 
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very platform) and not on competitors. This would render the comparison on 
net effects versus separate effects in each case – referring to the effects on 
each side of a platform – pointless, as they could not be reasonably opposed 
to effects borne outside the platform (i.e., by competitors) in the Google 
Shopping case.  
It is true that the United States and the single states that sued Amex 
made their claim concerning possible negative effects that the anti-steering 
provisions could have on interbrand competition – by blocking competition 
from rival credit card networks. But the case made it crystal clear that central 
to the discussion were the interests of the merchants as opposed to those of the 
cardholders.37 
In Amex, it is rather plausible (although incorrect from the antitrust 
law standpoint, in our view) to defend that competition was not at issue, 
because the anti-steering provisions would allegedly have the potential to 
foster competition by rewarding cardholders and giving Amex more 
foreseeability to calibrate the tension between both sides of the platform. As 
for Google Shopping, it is difficult to deny that it was a case of classical 
anticompetitive effects – those negative effects against competition – because 
only competitors felt hurt by virtue of Google allegedly favoring its own 
comparison shopping on the general search page. Advertisers continued to 
advertise regardless of whether Google would place the shopping engine, as 
long as it had a good impact on sales. Although it is possible to argue that 
some future or indirect negative effect could also impact those advertisers, 
who, because of the elimination of Google Shopping’s competitors, would be 
left with less supply options, the immediate burden was being borne by 
competing shopping platforms. In Amex, the burden was on merchants. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to say that Google brought about an actual 
competition concern, in the sense of something going beyond tensions within 
a platform, rendering it pointless to think of a net-effect analysis focusing on 
an anticompetitive or procompetitive balance within a single platform. 
This comparison leads to another logical reasoning that may be 
helpful to understand the different outcomes of the cases so far, even though 
both deal with two-sided platforms and adopt a single-market approach. If 
there is so much controversy over whether the negative effects borne by 
                                                     
37 As stated by the court: “This analysis erroneously elevated the interests of 
merchants above those of cardholders.” See US v. American Express, supra note 
6, at 204. 
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merchants in Amex (symmetrically situated, within the platform, vis-à-vis the 
advertisers on Google Shopping) could be justified (or not) by procompetitive 
effects within the single platform, what to say about anticompetitive effects 
extrapolating the boundaries of the Google Shopping platform, affecting 
competitors? If, for the District Court, procompetitive effects were not able to 
justify an issue raised within the Amex platform (negative effects on 
merchants), why would alleged internal efficiencies (the improvement of the 
user experience) justify external anticompetitive effects in Google Shopping? 
Our take is that Amex is a simpler case with respect to outweighing effects 
than is Google Shopping. Hence, if there is so much difficulty associated with 
accepting a possible procompetitive net-effect – internally to the platform – 
an even harder time should be expected in trying to outweigh external 
anticompetitive effects and internal efficiencies in Google Shopping.  
And even though we believe that, in Google Shopping, the single-
market approach was adequate under the theory of two-sided markets, we 
believe that the effects of the conduct on competitors also provided a practical 
reason for the single-market definition. For us, the fact that competitors were 
allegedly affected in Google Shopping made it easier for the EU to conceive 
of a single market corresponding to the shopping platform in its entirety. This 
is because that strategy would make it easier – and it actually it would make 
more sense – to put Google Shopping and its competitors side-by-side, in their 
entirety (as opposed to internally fragmented) to compare them. In so doing, 
the EU could even find that the traffic on Google Shopping increased while 
traffic on rival services (their whole platforms) decreased.38 Addressing 
platforms in their entirety would thus be more practical in order to depict the 
allegedly abusive scenario in a more comprehensive – and convincing – way.  
Also, it would be counterintuitive to try to compare only one of the 
sides of Google Shopping’s platform with a competitor’s platform in its 
entirety. It would be hard to consider effects on equal grounds having the EU 
comparing gains and efficiencies on the side of Google Shopping’s users with 
the broad anticompetitive effect over the competitors’ platforms as a whole. 
We also have to bear in mind that the competitors’ platforms in their entirety 
claimed that Google Shopping’s strategy was abusive. The interests of users 
and advertisers on those platforms were understood to converge, in the interest 
of the operability of the comparison shopping platforms. If that was the case 
with the competitors, why would it not be the case with Google Shopping; that 
                                                     
38 See Commission Press Release, IP/17/1784, supra note 1.  
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is, why would interests not be aligned on the Defendant’s platform as well? 
On top of that, the alignment of interests makes us believe that it would also 
be hard to conceive of a comparison between gains and efficiencies restricted 
to the side of Google Shopping’s users, weighed against negative effects 
restricted to the users’ side of the rival platforms.  
4. The limits of justification: both the Google Shopping and the Amex 
case should converge with regards to effects analysis 
Although the theory of two-sided markets can provide a persuasive 
defense against anticompetitive effects arguments, focused on the idea of a 
single market’s procompetitive “net effects” – as it could be seen in the US 
Supreme Court’s and Circuit Court’s decisions in the Amex case – that 
defense must be carefully scrutinized in view of the antitrust law principles 
and may not always prevail, as it was the case in Google Shopping. In our 
view, antitrust authorities around the world, when dealing with two-sided 
platforms, should think twice before going for the US Supreme Court’s and 
Circuit Court’s approaches in Amex and adopt the same caution that the EU 
adopted when dealing with the Google Shopping case, to avoid overlooking 
anticompetitive effects.  
While in Amex it is already difficult, at least for us, to admit that 
merchants can really benefit from Amex’s conduct, by not steering for other 
cards rather than Amex, in Google Shopping, it sounds particularly strange to 
admit that desirable effects in the users’ experience could compensate for 
anticompetitive effects on competitors. On the other hand, in our view, it is 
hard to think that Google would have an obligation to share a space on its own 
platform with other companies engaged in the comparison shopping market. 
Google created a product to compete with the players the company considers 
its actual competitors – mainly Amazon – and now it has been required to 
“share the pie” with smaller players. This seems unfair, at least at a glance, 
because it appears that those small players would be allowed to free ride on 
Google’s technology and efficiencies, just to become more representative 
competitors against Google itself.  
But the fact that Google Shopping’s platform actually landed on 
Google’s general search page invites a second look and further reflection. As 
Google itself highlighted,39 consumers are not interested in repeating 
                                                     
39 See public note issued by Google’s General Counsel, supra note 3. 
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searches, so, if they can already obtain shopping offers at the first click, it is 
reasonable to believe that they will have less incentive to repeat a search to 
target another specific comparison shopping service or scroll all the way down 
on the general search results page to find it, unless the efforts are towards 
another highly efficient and dominant player (such as Amazon). By 
benefitting from the power of what Google is primarily known for – as a 
general search engine – Google Shopping was actually not just Google 
Shopping playing at arm’s length with other shopping services. It was Google 
Shopping with the Google search “plus”, which those smaller competitors 
could not defeat. That scenario leaves an impression that competition in 
comparison shopping was probably not totally on the merits regarding the 
shopping platform in specific. We understand that the scenario could be totally 
different if Google Shopping were not placed on Google’s general search 
page, but left at the specific shopping tab only, because the incentives to click 
on the tab could reasonably be counterbalanced by the incentives to look for 
other shopping services on the search page itself or even a quick second search 
targeted at another comparison service provider. 
And the theory of two-sided platforms can also be helpful to explain 
the impression that competition was probably not totally on the merits with 
regards to Google Shopping. As mentioned above, it is reasonable to conceive 
of Google’s general search service as a separate platform in relation to Google 
Shopping, because the service provided on one side of the former platform is 
the one of bringing up search results arising from an algorithmic engine, and 
not comparison shopping results arising from a bidding process. On the other 
side, both platforms focus on selling information to advertisers and displaying 
ads in a certain way. We understand, though, that the essential difference 
regarding the results expected by users in each case makes both platforms 
actually different – regardless of the users’ alleged preference for a one-stop 
shop. Taking advantage of one platform because of the influence and power 
of another seems to show a way of gaining a special and unique advantage 
counting on merits outside the shopping platform. 
Hence, the EU seems correct in both (i) adopting a single market 
approach (the market for comparison shopping services) and (ii) not accepting 
the alleged benefits for users as counting for an “overall consumer 
satisfaction”, to outweigh anticompetitive effects on competitors in the 
comparison shopping market. Both undertakings are coherent in light of the 
theory of two-sided markets and the particularities of the case, as the EU 
decision sets an important precedent regarding the antitrust analysis of two-
sided Internet platforms.  
REVISTA DO REVISTA DO IBRAC Volume 24 - Número 2 - 2018 
449 
Concerning Google’s indication that Amazon would be its actual 
competitor,40 we wonder why it was not Amazon, but actually smaller 
companies, which filed the complaint against Google Shopping. Apparently, 
Amazon does not bother complaining about Google’s strategy. Would it be 
because of Amazon’s established market power in the online shopping 
industry? Maybe, although having market power does not guarantee that such 
power will be forever, so a dominant company would still have incentives to 
protect its dominance. Or, more likely, it is because Amazon has perceived 
Google Shopping as an efficient channel to gain even more visibility to its 
own platform and increase its profits?41 Note that the European Commission 
was more persuaded by the idea that Amazon and Google were actually 
business partners in a vertical relationship, and not competitors.42  
Conclusion  
In this paper, our aim was to analyze the 2017 European 
Commission’s judgment on Google Shopping in light of the theory of two-
sided markets and also of lessons from the Amex case in the US. As we 
addressed the approaches on relevant market and effects in both cases, we 
tried to understand the reasons behind the different outcomes in both cases, 
especially regarding the single-market approach leading to a net-effect 
analysis in Amex, but not in Google Shopping.  
We concluded that thinking of a “net-effect” versus a “separate-
effect” analysis in Amex makes sense, as the alleged anticompetitive effects 
remain within the platform, while doing the same thing in Google Shopping 
does not make as much sense. However, in our view, the same antitrust 
principles should govern both cases and, thus, guide both reflections on 
whether certain positive effects to a given group of consumers justify or not 
anticompetitive effects on another group. Therefore, the same antitrust 
preoccupation which, in Ohio v. American Express, was expressed by the 
District Court (but rebutted by the Circuit Court and eventually by the US 
                                                     
40 Idem, supra note 3. 
41 More about Amazon’s aggressive investment on Google Shopping 
advertisement can be found at: 
http://www.cpcstrategy.com/blog/2017/10/amazon-google-shopping-plas/.  
42 See the Commission Decision, case AT.39740 (Google Search (Shopping)), 
supra note 1, paragraph 220. 
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Supreme Court) to adopt a separate-effect analysis – in order to better fulfill 
the principles of antitrust law – was present in the European Commission 
decision of not accepting the positive effects claimed by Google in favor of 
its consumers. A lot of caution is needed when weighing anticompetitive 
effects against efficiencies, procompetitive effects or any benefits claimed to 
exist within certain group of consumers. 
After setting the basis of our analysis, we felt comfortable to opine 
on whether the EU was sufficiently careful when weighing the effects in the 
Google Shopping case. And we reach the conclusion that not only was its 
assessment careful, but also its final decision was satisfactory in light of the 
antitrust principles. 
Our view is that it was difficult for the Commission to find strong 
reasons for not addressing anticompetitive effects in the markets for 
comparison shopping, just because there could be desirable effects of quality 
improvement on one side of the Google Shopping platform (the users’ side). 
On top of that, it was simply hard to stand by Google when it was not just 
Google Shopping, but also Google Search coming into play – exactly what 
was claimed as the main threat to competition by means of artificial diversion 
of traffic. When stakes are high, authorities should require truly compelling 
reasons before giving up on protecting the competition environment from 
clear threats in the name of other benefits, efficiencies or even procompetitive 
effects potentially resulting from a conduct. This approach seems to better 
fulfill the goals of antitrust law enforcement.  
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